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Loikkaa: valikkoon, hakuun

Against Intellectual Monopoly: Chapter 1

906 tavua lisätty, 25. lokakuuta 2009 kello 05.57
ei muokkausyhteenvetoa
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Teollisesta vallankumouksesta on jo aikaa, mutta immateriaalikysymykset ovat kysymys aineettomasta omaisuudesta on edelleen esilläajankohtainen. Tätä kirjaa kirjoitettaessa yhdysvaltalaistuomari James Spencer on uhkaillut kolme vuotta kolmen vuoden ajan sulkea laajasti käytetyn Blackberry- Blackberryn viestintäverkon – patenttikiistan takia.^9 Eikä Blackberry ole itsekään mikään puhdas pulmunensynnitön: vuonna 2001 Blackberry haastoi oikeuteen Glenayre Electronicsin, koska kyseinen yritys loukkasi Blackberryn patenttia, joka koski push-tekniikkaa"informaation puskemista isäntäsysteemistä mobiilidatakommunikaatiolaitteeseen".^10¹⁰
Samanlainen sota käytiin on käynnissä tekijänoikeuksien kanssa. puolella - Napster-palvelu suljettiin liittovaltion tuomarin toimesta heinäkuussa 2000, koska palvelussa jaettiin tekijänoikeussuojattuja tiedostojakiistassa koskien tekijänoikeudella suojattujen tiedostojen jakoa.^11 ¹¹ Tunteet käyvät kuumina molemmilla puolillakummallakin puolella. Jotkut tekijänoikeusvastaiset libertaristit käyttävät slogania “informaatio vain haluaa olla vapaa”vapaana”. Toisessa ääripäässä, suuret levymusiikki- ja ohjelmistoyhtiöt väittävät “maailman maailman ilman immateriaalioikeuksia olevan maailma ilman uusia ideoita”ideoita.
Osa tekijänoikeusväittelyn katkeruudesta on heijastunut heijastuu Stephen Manesin hyökkäyksessä Lawrence Lessigiä kohtaan.:
''Stanfordin lakiprofessorin ja median suosikin Lawrence Lessigin mukaan, “liikkeen täytyy alkaa kaduilta” , jotta korruptoitunutta kongressia, ylikeskittynyttä mediaa ja ylihintaista oikeusjärjestelmää vastaan voidaan taistella. Contrary to Lessig's rantsVastoin Lessigin avautumista...“Fair “fair use” exceptions in existing copyright law-poikkeukset nykyisessä tekijänoikeuslaissa...are so expansive that just about the only thing cutovat niin ekspansiivisia, että melkeinpä ainoa asia, jota leikkaamalla-andja-pasters clearly can't do legally with a copyrighted work is directly copy a sizable portion of itliittämällä ei voi tehdä tekijänoikeuden alaiselle teokselle laillisesti, on kopioida merkittävää osaa siitä..^12¹²''
Certainly Varmastikaan Lessig is no friend of current copyright lawei ole nykyisen tekijänoikeuslain ystävä. Yet, despite Mutta huolimatta Stephen Manes assertions to the contraryManesin väitteestä, he does believe in balancing the rights of producers with the rights of usershän uskoo tuottajien ja kuluttajien välisten oikeuksien tasapainottamiseen: his book hänen kirjansa Free Culture speaks repeatedly of this balance and how it has been lost in modern lawpuhuu jatkuvasti tästä tasapainosta ja siitä, kuinka se on menetetty nykyaikaisessa laissa.^13¹³
Like Kuten Lessig, many economists are skeptical of current law – seventeen prominent economistsmonet taloustieteilijät ovat skeptisiä nykyisen lain suhteen - 17 huomattavaa taloustieteilijää, including several mukaanlukien useita Nobel Prize winners-palkinnon voittaneita, filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court in support of Lessig’s lawsuit challenging the extension of the length of copyrightjättivät kirjelmän Yhdysvaltain korkeimmalle oikeudelle kannattaakseen Lessigin haastetta tekijänoikeuden pituuden kyseenalaistamiseksi. Also like Kuten Lessig, economists recognize a role for intellectual propertymyös taloustieteilijät tunnustavat immateriaalioikeuksien roolin: where lawyers speak of balancing rightskun lakimiehet puhuvat oikeuksien tasapainottamisesta, economists speak of incentivestaloustieteilijät puhuvat kannustimista. To quote from a textbook by two prominent economists Lainataksemme kahden huomattavan taloustieteilijän, Robert Barro and Barron ja Xavier Sala-i-MartinMartinin oppikirjaa:
''It would be [good] to make the existing discoveries freely available to all producersOlisi hyvä antaa kaikki olemassa olevat keksinnöt vapaasti kaikkien tuottajien käyttöön, but this practice fails to provide themutta tämä käytäntö epäonnistuu tarjoamaan...incentives for further inventionskannustimia myöhempiin keksintöihin. A tradeoff arises between restrictions on the use of existing ideas and the rewards to inventive activityVastakkain ovat olemassaolevien ideoiden käyttö ja innovatiivisen toiminnan kannustin.^14¹⁴''
IndeedTosiaan, while many of us enjoy the benefits of being able to freely download music from the internetkun monet meistä nauttivat mahdollisuudesta ladata vapaasti musiikkia internetistä, we worry as well how the musician is to make a living if her music is immediately given away for freeme olemme myös huolissamme siitä, kuinka muusikko voi ansaita elantonsa mikäli hänen musiikkinsa on välittömästi jaossa ilmaiseksi.
While a furious debate rages over copyrights and patentsVaikka keskustelu tekijänoikeuksista ja patenteista käykin kiivaana, there is general agreement that some protection is needed to secure for inventors and creators the fruits of their laborson olemassa yleinen hyväksyntä sille, että jonkinlaista suojaa tarvitaan keksijöille ja luojille, jotta he voisivat nauttia työnsä hedelmistä. The rhetoric that “information just wants to be free” suggests that no one should be allowed to profit from her ideas"Informaatio vain haluaa olla vapaana" -retoriikka vihjaa, ettei kukaan saisi ansaita omilla ideoillaan. Despite thisTästä huolimatta ei näytä olevan kovinkaan vahvaa vaatimusta, there does notseem to be a strong lobby arguing that while it is ok for the rest of us to benefit from the fruits of our laborsettä samalla kun muiden on aivan hyväksyttävää kerätä oman työnsä hedelmät, inventors and creators should have to subsist on the charity of otherskeksijöiden ja luojien täytyisi tulla toimeen muiden hyväntekeväisyydellä.
For all the emotionKaikesta tunteellisuudesta huolimatta näyttää siltä, it seems both sides agree that intellectual property laws need to strike a balance between providing sufficient incentive for creation and the freedom to make use of existing ideasettä kummatkin osapuolet ovat samaa mieltä siitä, että immateriaalioikeuslakien tarvitsee löytää tasapaino luomistyön kannustimien tarjoamisen ja olemassa olevien ideoiden käytön vapauden välille. Put it differentlyToisin sanoen, kummatkin osapuolet ovat yksimielisiä siitä, että immateriaalioikeuslait ovat "tarpeellinen paha" joka synnyttää uutta innovaatiota, both sides agree that intellectual property rights are a “necessary evil” that fostersinnovationja erimielisyys koskee sitä, and disagreement is over where the line should be drawnmihin kohtaa viiva olisi piirrettävä. For the supporters of intellectual propertyAineettoman omaisuuden puolustajat pitävät nykyisiä monopolituottoja juuri ja juuri riittävinä, current monopoly profits are barely enough; for its enemies currently monopoly profits are too highkun taas sen vastustajat pitävät niitä aivan liian korkeina.
Our analysis leads to conclusions that are at variance with both sidesOma analyysimme johtaa erimielisyyteen kummankin puolen kanssa. Our reasoning proceeds along the following linesJärkeilymme kulkee seuraavanlaisesti. Everyone wants a monopolyJokainen haluaa monopolin. No one wants to compete against his own customers, or against imitatorsKukaan ei halua kilpailla omien asiakkaidensa tai matkijoiden kanssa. Currently patents and copyrights grant producers of certain ideas a monopolyTällä hetkellä patentit ja tekijänoikeudet antavat tiettyjen ideoiden tuottajille monopolin. Certainly few people do something in exchange for nothingLuonnollisesti muutamat ihmiset tekevät jotain myös vastikkeettomasti. Creators of new goods are not different from producers of old onesUusien hyödykkeiden luojat eivät eroa vanhojen hyödykkeiden tuottajista: they want to be compensated for their efforthe haluavat saada korvauksen vaivannäöstään. HoweverOn kuitenkin pitkä ja vaarallinen hyppäys väitteestä, it is a long and dangerous jump from the assertion that innovators deserve compensation for their efforts to the conclusion that patents and copyrightsettä keksijät ansaitsevat korvaukset vaivannäöstään siihen, that is monopolyettä patentit ja tekijänoikeudet, are the best or the only way of providing that rewardeli monopolioikeudet, ovat paras tai ainoa tapa tuottaa se korvaus. Statements such as “A patent is Väitteet kuten "patentti on ''these'' way of rewarding somebody for coming up with a worthy commercial idea”^15 abound in the businesstapa, legal and economic pressjolla jotakuta palkitaan arvokkaan kaupallisen idean keksimisestä, ovat yleisiä bisnes-, laki- ja talouslehdissä. As we shall see there are many other ways in which innovators are rewarded Kuten tulemme näkemään, on olemassa monia muitakin tapoja, joilla keksijöitä palkitaan, even substantiallyjopa huomattavan suuresti, and most of them are better for society than the monopoly power patents and copyright currently bestowja joista monet ovat parempia yhteiskunnalle kuin se monopolivoima, jonka patentit ja tekijänoikeudet nykyisellään suovat. Since innovators may be rewarded even without patents and copyrightKoska keksijöitä voidaan palkita myös ilman patentteja ja tekijänoikeuksia, we should askmeidän tulee kysyä: is it true that intellectual property achieves the intended purpose of creating incentives for innovation and creation that offset their considerable harmOnko totta, että aineeton omaisuus saavuttaa halutun päämäärän, eli luo kannustimia uuden keksimiselle ja luomiselle, jotka puolestaan korvaavat niistä aiheutuvat haitat?
This book examines both the evidence and the theoryTämä kirja tarkastelee sekä todisteita että teoriaa. Our conclusion is that creators’ property rights can be well protected in the absence of intellectual propertyJohtopäätöksemme on, and that the latter does not increase either innovation or creationettä luojien omistusoikeudet voivat olla hyvin suojattuja ilman aineetonta omaisuutta, eikä aineeton omaisuus kasvata innovaatiota eikä uuden luomista. They are an unnecessary evilSe on tarpeeton paha.
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This is a book about economicsTämä kirja kertoo taloustieteestä, not about lawei laista. Or put differentlyTai toisin sanoen, it is not about what the law is but rather what the law should betämä ei kerro millainen laki on, vaan millainen sen pitäisi olla. If you are interested in whether or not you are likely to wind up in jail for sharing your files over the internetJos olet kiinnostunut siitä, this is not the book for youkuinka todennäköisesti joudut vankilaan tiedostojen jakamisesta internetissä, tämä kirja ei ole sinulle. If you are interested in whether it is a good Jos olet kiinnustunut siitä, onko hyvä idea for the law to prevent you from sharing your files over the internetantaa lain estää sinua jakamasta tiedostoja internetissä, then this book is for youniin silloin tämä kirja on sinulle.
HoweverHuolimatta siitä, while this book is not about the lawettä tämä kirja ei ole laista, some background on the law is necessary to understanding the economic issuesjotain taustatuntemusta laista silti tarvitaan ymmärtämään taloustieteelliset kysymykset. We are going to examine the economics of what hasTulemme tarkastelemaan taloustieteellisesti sitä, in recent years, come to be called “intellectual propertymitä viime aikoina on alettu kutsumaan "aineettomaksi omaisuudeksi",” especially patents and copyrighterityisesti patentteja ja tekijänoikeuksia. In factItseasiassa on olemassa kolme erilaista aineettoman omaisuuden tyyppiä, there are three broad types of intellectual property recognized in most legal systemsjotka suurin osa lakijärjestelmistä tunnustaa: patentspatentit, copyrights and trademarkstekijänoikeudet ja tavaramerkit.
Trademarks are different in nature than patents and copyrightsTavaramerkit ovat luonnostaan erilaisia verrattuna patentteihin ja tekijänoikeuksiin: they serve to identify the providers of goodsniiden tarkoitus on identifioida hyödykkeiden, services or ideaspalveluiden ja ideoiden tuottajat. Copying Kopiointi which would be a violation of copyright mikä olisi tekijänoikeuden loukkaus is quite different from lying on hyvin erilaista verrattuna valehteluun which would be a violation of trademarkmikä olisi tavaramerkin loukkaus. We do not know of a good reason for allowing market participants to steal identities or masquerade as people they are notMe emme tiedä hyvää syytä antaa markkinaosapuolten varastaa toisten identiteettejä tai naamioitua ihmisiksi, joita he eivät ole. ConverselyPäinvastoin, there are strong economic advantages in allowing market participants to voluntarily identify themselveson olemassa vahvoja taloudellisia hyötyjä siitä, että markkinaosapuolten annetaan vapaaehtoisesti identifioida itsensä. While we may wonder if it is necessary to allow the Intel Corporation a monopoly over the use of the word “insideVaikka voimmekin pohtia, onko välttämätöntä antaa Intelille monopolioikeutta käyttää sanaa "inside",” in general there is little economic dispute over the merits of trademarkson yleisesti ottaen hyvin vähän taloustieteellistä epäselvyyttä tavaramerkkien ansioista.
Patents and copyrightsPatentit ja tekijänoikeudet, the two forms of intellectual property on which we focuskaksi tekijänoikeuden muotoa joihin keskitymme, are a subject of debate and controversyovat debatin ja kiistelyn kohteena. They differ from each other in the extent of coverage they provide Ne eroavat toisistaan suojan laajuudessa, jonka ne tarjoavat. Patents apply to specific implementations of ideas Patentit koskevat erityisenlaista toteutusta ideasta although in recent years in the U.S. there has been decreasing emphasis joskin viime vuosina Yhdysvalloissa on specificityviime vuosina kiinnitetty yhä vähemmän huomiota erityisyyteen. Patents do not last foreverPatentit eivät kestä ikuisesti: in the United StatesYhdysvalloissa 20 vuotta patenteille, 20 years for patents covering techniques of manufacturejotka suojaavat valmistustekniikkaa, and ja 14 years for ornamentationvuotta muotoa suojaaville. Patents provide relatively broad protectionPatentit tarjoavat suhteellisen laajan suojan: no one can legally use the same ideakukaan ei voi laillisesti käyttää samaa ideaa, even if they independently rediscover itvaikka hän keksisikin sen itsenäisesti, without permission from the patent holderilman patentin haltijan lupaa.^16¹⁶
Copyrights are narrower in scopeTekijänoikeudet ovat skaalaltaan kapeampia, protecting only the specific details of a particular narrative suojaten vain tiettyä yksityiskohtaista ja ainutlaatuista teosta although as with the case of patentsjoskin samaan tapaan patenttien kanssa, the scope has been increasing in recent yearsskaala on laajentunut viime vuosina. Copyright is also much longer in duration than patent Tekijänoikeus on myös paljon pidempi kestoltaan kuin patentti the life of the author tekijän elinikä plus 50 years for the many signatory countries of the BerneConventionvuotta monissa Bernin sopimuksen allekirjoittaneissa valtioissa, and ja in the U.S. since the Yhdysvalloissa Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act Actin ansiosta the life of the author plus tekijän elinikä olus 70 yearsvuotta.^17¹⁷
In the UYhdysvalloissa tekijänoikeuksille asetettuja rajoituksia ei löydy patenttilaista.S. there are limitations on copyright not present in patent law. As Kuten Stephen Manes correctly points out in his attack on aivan oikein tuo esiin hyökkäyksessään Lawrence LessigLessigiä vastaan, the right of "fair use allows the purchaser of a copyrighted item limited rights to employ it" antaa tekijänoikeudella suojatun teoksen omistajalle rajoitettuja oikeuksia käyttää sitä, make partial copies of it and resell themtehdä osittaisia kopioita siitä ja myydä niitä, regardless of the desires of the copyright holderriippumatta tekijänoikeuden omistajan mielihaluista. In addition, certain derivative works are allowed without permissionSen lisäksi tietyt johdannaisteokset ovat sallittuja ilman lupaa: parodies are allowed, for exampleesimerkiksi parodia on sallittua, while sequels are notkun taas jatko-osat eivät.
In the case of both patents and copyrightSekä patenttien että tekijänoikeuksien tapaukessa, from the point of view of economicstaloustieteellisestä näkökulmasta, there are two ingredients in the lawlaki on kaksiosainen: the right to buy and sell copies of ideasoikeus ostaa ja myydä kopioita ideasta, and the right to control how other people make use of their copiesja oikeus kontrolloida kuinka ihmiset käyttävät omia kopioitaan. The first right is not controversialEnsimmäinen oikeus ei ole kiistanalainen. In copyright lawTekijänoikeuslaissa, when applied to the creator this right is sometimes called the “right of first salekun sitä sovelletaan teoksen luojaan, tätä kutsutaan usein "ensimmäisen myynnin oikeudeksi".” However, it extends also to the legitimate rights of others to sell their copiesKuitenkin se jatkuu myös laillisena oikeutena muille myydä omistamiaan kopioita. It is the second right, enabling the owner to control the use of intellectual property after saleToinen oikeus sen sijaan on kiistanalainen, that is controversialantaessaan aineettoman omaisuuden omistajalle oikeuden kontrolloida omaisuutta myynnin jälkeen. This right produces a monopoly Tämä oikeus tuottaa monopolin enforced by the obligation of the government to act against individuals or organizations that use the idea in ways prohibited by the copyright or patent holdervaltio velvoitetaan toimimaan sellaisia henkilöitä tai organisaatioita vastaan, jotka käyttävät ideaa tekijänoikeuden tai patentin omistajan kiellosta huolimatta.
In addition to the well-known forms of intellectual property Aineettoman omaisuuden paremmin tunnettujen muotojen patents and copyright patenttien ja tekijänoikeuksien there are also lesser-known ways of protecting ideaslisäksi on myös vähemmän tunnettuja tapoja suojata ideoita. These include contractual agreementsNäitä ovat sopimukset, such as the kuten shrink-wrap and - ja click-through agreements that you never read when you buy software-ehdot, joita kukaan ei ikinä lue ostaessaan ohjelmistoa. They also include the most traditional form of protection Sellainen on myös perinteisin suojauksen muoto trade secrecy liikesalaisuus as well as its contractual and legal manifestations such as non-disclosure agreementssekä sen sopimusoikeudelliset ja juridiset muodot kuten salassapitosopimukset. Like patents and copyright all of these devices serve to help the originator of an idea maintain a monopoly over itKuten patentit ja tekijänoikeudet, nämä kaikki keinot auttavat idean alkuperäistä omistajaa pitämään monopolin siihen.
We do not know of any legitimate argument that producers of ideas should not be able to profit from their creationsMe emme tiedä yhtään legitiimiä argumenttia sen puolesta, että ideoiden tuottajat eivät saisi hyötyä keksinnöistään. While ideas could be sold in the absence of a legal rightVaikka ideoita voisikin myydä ilman laillisia oikeuksia, markets function best in the presence of clearly defined property rightsmarkkinat toimivat parhaiten kun on olemassa selkeästi määritellyt omistusoikeudet. Not only should the property rights of innovators be protected but also therights of those who have legitimately obtained a copy of the ideaEi ainoastaan keksijän omistusoikeus tulisi olla suojeltu, vaan myös niiden oikeudet, jotka ovat laillisesti hankkineet kopion ideasta, directly or indirectlysuoraan tai epäsuoraan, from the original innovatoralkuperäiseltä keksijältä. The former encourages innovationEnsimmäinen kannustaa keksimään, the latter encourages the diffusionjälkimmäinen kannustaa keksintöjen leviämistä, adoption and improvement of innovationsomaksumista ja parantamista.
WhyMiksi kuitenkin pitäisi keksijöillä olla oikeus kontrolloida kuinka ostajat käyttävät ideaa tai luomusta? Tämä antaa keksijälle monopolin ideaan. Me viittaamme tähän oikeuteen "aineettomana monopolina", howeverkorostaaksemme, should creators have the right to control how purchasers make use of an idea or creation? This gives creators a monopoly over the idea. We refer to this right as “intellectual monopolyettä se on tämä kaikkia kopioita ideasta koskeva monopoli,” to emphasize that it is this monopoly over all copies of an idea that is controversialjoka on kiistanalainen, not the right to buy and sell copiesei oikeus ostaa ja myydä kopioita. The government does not ordinarily enforce monopolies for producers of other goodsValtio ei yleensä ylläpidä muiden hyödykkeiden tuottajien monopoleja. This is because it is widely recognized that monopoly creates many social costsTämä siksi, koska on laajalti huomioitu, että monopolit luovat monia sosiaalisia kustannuksia.Intellectual monopoly is no different in this respectAineeton monopoli ei eroa tässä suhteessa. The question we address is whether it also creates social benefits commensurate with these social costsHaluamme esittää kysymyksen, luoko se myös sosiaalista hyötyä, joka ylittäisi nämä sosiaaliset kustannukset.
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The U.S. Constitution allows Congress “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”^18 ”¹⁸ Our perspective on patents and copyright is a similar one: promoting the progress of science and the useful arts is a crucial ingredient of economic welfare, from solving such profound economic problems as poverty, to such mundane personal nuisances as boredom. From a social point of view, and in the view of the founding fathers, the purpose of patents and copyrights is not to enrich the few at the expense of the many. Nobody doubts that J. K. Rowling and Bill Gates have been greatly enriched by their intellectual property – nor is it surprising that they would argue in favor of it. But common sense and theU.S. Constitution say that these rights must be justified by bringing benefits to all of us. 
The U.S. Constitution is explicit that what is to be given to authors and inventors is an exclusive right – a monopoly. Implicit is the idea that giving this monopoly serves to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The U.S. Constitution was written in 1787. At that time, the idea of copyright and patent was
today we are all jet setters. Is not the explosion of creativity and invention unleashed since the writing of the U.S. Constitution a testimony to the powerful benefit of intellectual property? Would not the world without patent and copyright be a sad cold world, empty of new music and of marvelous new inventions?
So the first question we will pose is what the world might be like without intellectual monopoly. Patents and copyrights have not secured monopolies on all ideas at all times. It is natural then to examine times and industries in which legal protection for ideas have not been available to see whether innovation and creativitywere thriving or were stifled. It is the case, for example, that neither the internet nor the jet engine were invented in hopes of securing exclusive rights. In fact, we ordinarily think of “innovative monopoly” as an oxymoron. We shall see that when monopoly over ideas is absent, competition is fierce – and that as a result innovation and creativity thrive. Whatever a world without patents and copyrights would be like, it would not be a world devoid of great new music and beneficial new drugs.
You will gather by now that we are skeptical of monopoly – as are economists in general. Our second topic will be an examination of the many social costs created by copyrights and patents. Adam Smith – a friend and teacher of James Watt – was one of the first economists to explain how monopolies make less available at a higher price. In some cases, such as the production of music, this may not be a great social evil; in other cases such as the availability of AIDS drugs, it may be a very great evil indeed. However, as we shall see, low availability and high price is only one of the many costs of monopoly. The example of James Watt is a case in point: by making use of the legal system, he inhibited competition and prevented his competitors from introducing useful new advances. We shall also see that because there are no countervailing market forces, government-enforced monopolies such as intellectual monopoly are particularly problematic.
While monopoly may be evil, and while innovation may thrive in the absence of traditional legal protections such as patents and copyrights, it may be that patents and copyrights serve to increase innovation. The presumption in the U.S. Constitution is that they do, and that the benefits of more entertainment and more
innovation outweigh the costs of these monopolies. Certainly the monopolies created by patents and copyright may be troublesome – but if that is the cost of having blockbuster movies, automobiles and flu vaccine, most of us are prepared to put up with it. That is the position traditionally taken by economists, most of whomsupport patents and copyright, at least in principle. Some of them take the view that intellectual monopoly is an unavoidable evil if we are to have any innovation at all; other simply argue that at least some modest amount of intellectual monopoly is desirable to provide adequate incentive for innovation and creation. Our thirdtopic will be an examination of the theoretical arguments supporting intellectual monopoly, as well as counter-arguments about why intellectual monopoly may hurt rather than foster creative activity.
It is crucial to recognize that intellectual monopoly is a double-edged sword. The rewards to innovative effort are certainly greater if success is awarded a government monopoly. But the existence of monopolies also increases the cost of creation. In one extreme case, a movie that cost $218 to make had to pay $400,000
for the music rights.^19 ¹⁹ As we will argue at length, theoretical arguments alone cannot tell us if intellectual monopoly increases or decreases creative activity.
In the final analysis, the only justification for intellectual property is that it increases – ''de facto'' and substantially – innovation and creation. What have the last 219 years taught us? Our final topic is an examination of the evidence about intellectual monopoly and innovation. Is it a fact that intellectual monopolyleads to more creativity and innovation? Our examination of the data shows no evidence that it does. Nor are we the first economists to reach this conclusion. After reviewing an earlier set of facts in 1958, the distinguished economist Fritz Machlup wrote
''“it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting [a patent system].”^20”²⁰''
Since there is no evidence that intellectual monopoly achieves the desired purpose of increasing innovation and creation, it has no benefits. So there is no need for society to balance the benefits against the costs. This leads us to our final conclusion: intellectual property is an unnecessary evil.
'''Comments'''
We are grateful to George Selgin and John Turner, of the University of Georgia Terry College of Business, for pointing out a number of factual mistakes and imprecisions in our rendition of the James Watt story, as it had appeared in earlier versions of this chapter and in our 2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture, published inBoldrin and Levine [2004]. In a recent article, Selgin and Turner [2006], also take issue with our interpretation of the facts and add a few additional ones that, in their view, contradict our vision of James Watt as a primary example of an intellectual monopolist. It seems clear, even from the references quoted by Selgin and Turner, that many students of the Industrial Revolution share our view – more properly: we shared theirs.
Selgin and Turner’s argument and facts do not, however, address the issues we raise about Boulton and Watt. Take their discussion of the hypothetical “Watt sans patent.” Obviously Boulton and Watt fought hard for their patents, and obviously they claimed innovation would have been impossible without them. Our point is another: could they have made enough money to compensate their opportunity cost without the patent? All the evidence, including that reported by Selgin and Turner, suggests this is the case. In fact they make our case quite convincingly: quoting F.M. Scherer they assert that seventeen years before the second patent expired they, Boulton and Watt, were already breaking even. In economics, “breaking even” means that your opportunity costs have been paid, and your capital has received therisk-adjusted, expected return, and Scherer is a distinguished economist. Whatever profits Boulton and Watt made after that, were all extra rents due to monopoly power and, economically, not needed to pay their opportunity costs. So, we all agree that, at least for the final 17 years, the patent was not serving a useful economic purpose, hence it was damaging because it created monopoly distortions.
'''Notes'''
^1 ¹ Lord [1923] p. 5-3.htm.
^2 ² Carnegie [1905] p. 157.
^3 ³ Much of the story of James Watt can be found in Carnegie [1905], Lord [1923], and Marsden [2004]. Information on the role of Boulton in Watt’s enterprise is drawn from Mantoux [1905]. A lively description of the real Watt, as well of his legal wars against Hornblower – and many other – and of how he subsequently used his status to alter the public memory of the facts, can be found in Marsden [2004]. That Pickard’s patent was unjust is also the view of Selgin and Turner (2006), who, like Watt, do not seem to provide any evidence of why it was so.
As both the Lord and Carnegie works are out of copyright, both are available online at the very good Rochester site on the history of steam power www.history.rochester.edu/steam. Later drafts of this chapter benefited enormously from the arrival of Google Book Search, which allowed us to check so many original
historical sources about James Watt and the steam engine we would have never thought possible.
4 Lord [1923] gives figures on the number of steam engines produced by Boulton and Watt between 1775 and 1800, while the ''The Cambridge Economic History of Europe'' [1965] provides data on the spread of total horsepower between 1800 and 1815 and the spread of steam power more broadly. However, Kanefsky [1979] has largely discredited the Lord numbers, which is why we use figures on machines and horsepower from Kanefsky and Robey [1980].
Our horsepower calculations are based on 510 steam engines generating about 5,000 horsepower in the U.K. in 1760. During the subsequent forty years we estimate that about 1,740 engines generating about 30,000 horsepower were added. This gives our estimate that the total increased at a rate of roughly 750 horsepower each year. For 1815 we estimate about 100,000 horsepower – that is, the average of the figures Kanefsky and Robey [1980] give for 1800 and 1830. This together with the 35,000 horsepower we estimate for 1800 gives our estimate that the total increased at a rate of roughly 4,000 horsepower each year after 1800.
Data on the fuel efficiency, the “duty,” of steam engines is from Nuvolari [2004b].
5 Kanefsky and Robey [1980] together with Smith [1977-78] provide a careful historical account of the detrimental impact of the Newcomen’s, first, and of Watt’s patents, later, on the rate of adoption of steam technology. Apart from the books just quoted, information about the Hornblower’s engine and its relation to Watt’s are widely available through easily accessible web sites, such as Encyclopedia Britannica, Wikipedia, and so on. Some details of Hornblower’s invention may be of interest. It was patented in 1781 and consisted of a steam engine with two cylinders, significantly more efficient than the Boulton and Watt design. Boulton and Watt challenged his invention, claiming infringement of their patent because Hornblower engine used a separate condenser, and won. With the 1799 judicial decisionagainst him, Hornblower had to pay Boulton and Watt a substantial amount of money for past royalties, while losing all opportunities to further develop the compound engine. His compound steam engine principle was not revived until 1804 by Arthur Woolf. It became one of the main ingredients in the efficiency explosion that followed the expiration of Boulton and Watt’s patent.
Watt’s low-pressure engines were a dead end for further development; history shows that high-pressure, non-condensing engines were the way forward. Boulton and Watt’s patent, covering all kinds of steam engines prevented anyone from working seriously on the high-pressure version until 1800. This included William Murdoch, an employee of Boulton and Watt, who had developed a version of the high-pressure engine in the early 1780s. He named it the “steam carriage” and was legally barred from developing it by Boulton and Watt’s successful addition of the high-pressure engine to their patent, although Boulton and Watt never spent a cent to develop it. For the details of this story the reader should check the on line site Cotton Times at http://www.cottontimes.co.uk/ or Carnegie [1905, pp. 140-141]. The “William Murdoch” entry in Wikipedia provides a good summary. More generally various researchers directly connect Murdoch to Trevithick, who is now considered the official“inventor” (in 1802) of the high-pressure engine. Quite plainly, the evidence suggests that Boulton and Watt’s patent retarded the high-pressure steam engine, and hence economic development, of about 16 years.
6 The story about Pickard’s patent blocking adoption by Watt is told in von Tunzelmann [1978].
7 Thompson [1847] p. 110 and quoted also in Lord [1923].
8 Scherer [1984] pp. 24-25.
9 U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Virginia Plaintiff NTP, Inc. v. Defendant Research In Motion Ltd. Civil Action Number 3:01CV767-JRS.
10 ¹⁰ U.S. Patent 6219694.
11 ¹¹ United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Court, In Re: Napster.
12 ¹² Stephen Manes [2004].
13 ¹³ Lessig [2004].
14 ¹⁴ Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin [1999] p. 290.
15 ¹⁵ ''The Economist'', June 23rd 2001, page 42, with italics added.
16 ¹⁶ Information on U.S. Patent Law can be found at the U.S. Patent Office at www.uspto.gov/main/patents.htm. In addition to utility and design patents, there is also a third class of patent, the plant patent. Like a utility patent, a plant patent lasts 20 years.
17 ¹⁷ The Sony Bono Copyright Extension Act can be found online at library.thinkquest.org/J001570/sonnybonolaw.html, while the Berne Convention on Copyright can be found at www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/. A useful discussion of fair use, including parodies, is Gall [2000].
18 ¹⁸ U.S. Constitution Article 1, Section 8. The U.S. Constitution, not being copyrighted, is online at various places, such as http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution.
19 ¹⁹ The $218 movie was Tarnation and the information from BBC News, is at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3720455.stm.
20 ²⁰ Machlup [1958], p. 80. He nevertheless concluded that we should keep the patent system. We discuss his position further in our conclusion.
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